本研究以臺中在2004年啟動的自辦單元重劃區開發為案例，探究自辦市地重劃的運作機制與矛盾特質。自辦市地重劃的驅動力量、制度安排與組織運作特徵為何？其開發主體--依法應是由地主組成的重劃會，何以跟許多地主發生嚴重的對立衝突？自辦市地重劃的地主多數決同意之本質又為何？本研究在階級壟斷地租及治理術理論的基礎上，提出「共識製造技術」概念，以闡釋自辦市地重劃的權力實踐及治理矛盾。為加快推動大面積的單元重劃區開發，臺中的政商聯盟利用寬鬆的制度架構和法律漏洞，操作一系列擬仿地主多數決同意的權力技術，開發商虛增人頭地主、虛擬理監事地主、假造會員大會委託書、運作理監事選舉無記名投票，而都市政權也相應地佈署一套人頭地主治理術，製造出地主過半同意重劃的表象，促使開發商順利取得重劃會控制權，藉之擷取市地重劃抵費地的壟斷地租。然而單元二的黎明幼兒園反迫遷抗爭訴訟揭露了自辦重劃的共識製造技術，該單元的重劃會成立實際上未曾取得地主過半同意，其他單元的重劃會亦存在類似的法律瑕疵。本研究指出，共識製造技術是臺中都市發展之權力幾何學的新元素，促進了親成長的都市權力結構再生產。

Taking Taichung’s self-implemented unit readjustment development projects launched after 2004 as examples, this article aims to explore the driving mechanism and contradictory characteristics of the urban land readjustment implemented by the private sector. Our research questions are, firstly, what are the driving forces, institutional arrangements and operational characteristics of the urban land readjustment implemented by the private sector in Taichung’s unit readjustment zones? Secondary, since the main body of the developer-the readjustment association, should be composed of the landlords, why does it have serious conflicts with many landlords? Thirdly, what is the nature of the landlord’s majority decision for the urban land readjustment implemented by the private sector? Based on the theories of class-monopoly rent and governmentality, this research puts forward the concept of "technology of consensus manufacturing" to answer these questions. To fasten the unit readjustment zones’ development, Taichung’s political-business coalition operated a series of power technology that simulated the over-half consent of the landlords through taking advantage of the land readjustment institution’s loose regulation framework. These technologies of consensus manufacturing included: falsely increase the amounts of nominal landlord, simulate the land ownership of the candidate of the board of directors and supervisors, fabricate the power of attorney for landlords’ general assembly as well as using the secret ballots to elect the board of directs and supervisors in the general assembly. Furthermore, the urban regime deployed a corresponding governmentality of nominal landlord. Through these power technologies and deployment, the growth machine obtained the control of the readjustment association’s board of directors and supervisors, and drive it to extract huge amount of land rent from the cost equivalent land in the unit readjustment zones. However, the Li-ming Kindergarten’ anti-eviction movement and litigation process revealed the practice of consensus manufacturing technology and the fact that the establishment of Unit Two’s readjustment association has not actually obtained the consent of more than half of the landlords. Moreover, there were similar legal flaws in the elections of other readjustment units’ board of directors and supervisors. We argue the technology of consensus manufacturing is the new element of urban development’s power geometry in Taichung and contributing to the social reproduction of pro-growth power structure.