隨著中國對外投資的能力日益增加，中國透過投資（特別是透過「一帶一路」的各種項目）在各國創造出「債務陷阱」的說法也喧囂而上。然而，相關文獻對於中國是否在各國創造出「債務陷阱」的意見莫衷一是，而且迄今也尚未有大樣本的經驗資料來系統性地探討這個問題。據此，本文的目的，就是根據最新可得的債務資料以及對於「債務陷阱」作更精確的定義，來探討來自中國的投資是否系統性地與「債務陷阱」現象的出現有顯著的關聯性。來自全球180個國家從2000∼2017年這段期間的資料顯示，中國的投資占GDP的比率愈高的國家，積欠中國的債務占其GDP的比率愈高，償還中國貸款的能力愈低，並且在外交政策的利益上更接近中國的立場，也與中國在互動上有著更低比率的衝突與更高比率的合作。這些經驗證據在以「國家」為單位的分析單位上支持了「中國投資」與「債務陷阱」現象兩者之間的關聯性。但由於缺乏跨國跨時的資料，這些國家在因果關係上到底是因為先具有這些特質所以才得到中國的投資與貸款（並非中國有意為之的「債務陷阱」現象），還是因為先得到中國的投資與貸款所以才展現出這些特質（與中國可能有關的「債務陷阱」現象），就有待未來更多可得的跨國跨時資料才能再做進一步的探討。

As China’s capacity to invest abroad expands, so does the concern that China may be pushing countries into “debt traps,” particularly through various projects within the Belt and Road Initiative. However, the existing literature does not offer a consensus on whether China has indeed created “debt traps” in these countries. Moreover, large-scale empirical studies specifically addressing this issue have been notably absent. Hence, the primary objective of this article is to conduct an initial empirical examination of the relationship between “Chinese investment” and the concept of a “debt trap.” This will be based on the latest available debt data and a more precise definition of what constitutes a “debt trap.” The aim is to investigate whether there is a systematic and significant association between Chinese investment and the purported phenomenon of a “debt trap.” Drawing upon data from 180 countries worldwide spanning the years 2000 to 2017, it is evident that countries that have received greater Chinese investment tend to exhibit higher levels of debt owed to China, diminished debt repayment capacity, and closer alignment with China’s foreign policy interests. Additionally, they tend to experience lower rates of conflict and higher rates of cooperation with China in their bilateral relations. All of these empirical findings support the hypothesis that there is a substantial statistical correlation between “Chinese investment” and the concept of a “debt trap” at the state level of analysis. However, due to the absence of panel data, the direction of causality remains uncertain. Specifically, it is unclear whether these countries first exhibit these characteristics and subsequently receive investment and loans from China, leading to a “debt trap” phenomenon that is not intentionally caused by China. Conversely, it is possible that these countries receive investment and loans from China first, which subsequently results in them displaying these characteristics, suggesting a “debt trap” phenomenon that may be associated with China. A more thorough investigation of causality awaits the availability of panel data in the future.