依2015年通過之企業併購法第六條，公開發行股票之公司於召開董事會決議併購事項前，除設有審計委員會者，否則即應設置特別委員會。特別委員會應聘請獨立專家協助就併購條件之合理性提供意見，審議本次併購計畫與交易之公平性與合理性，再將審議結果提報董事會及股東會。特別委員會應由與併購案不具利害關係之人組成，經特別委員會審議後，即能沖淡潛在之利益衝突，間接維護股東權益。特別委員會制度主要係參考美國判例法而來，強調沖淡利害衝突功能，但此功能發揮前提需確保特別委員會具有實質審查權與獨立性，但觀我國目前法規設計仍對此二者有諸多不合之處，令人質疑其是否能發揮預期功能。故本文擬以特別委員會新制為題，以比較法之角度探討我國之特別委員會制度設計缺陷與未來施行可能面臨之問題，供我國法規未來改進之參考。

According to Article 6 of Taiwan Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (“M&A Act”) which was amended in 2015, to establish a special committee is required for a public company in M&A transactions. The committee should hire independent advisors offering opinions with respect to fairness and reasonableness of the proposed transaction and then should determine whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to the company and its shareholders. The committee should submit its opinion to the board of directors and shareholders’ meeting for reference. As the committee is consisted of independent and disinterested persons, the problem of potential conflict of interest can be avoided so as to protect shareholders’ interests. This type of institution is derived from U.S. law, but current setting under M&A Act cannot fully reflect the U.S. counterpart. This article will analyze the problems and drawbacks, theoretically and practically, from U.S. law’s perspective.